Since 1945, What Criticisms have been leveled at the Security Council? How justified are they?

Exploring Veto Power, Membership on the UN Security Council, Nature of the Security Council

Introduction

The Security Council is one of the principle organs of the United Nations System. It is the prevalent perception that the Council has been the one and only organ in the UN system that really matters (Luck, 2006. p111). The main purpose of the Security Council (SC) which is UN’s enforcer is to peace and security within the international system by preventing or stopping armed conflict among and even within nations (Fasulo 2003, p39). The Council comprises of 15 members. There are five permanent members (the P5): China, France, Russia, UK and USA. All these members were the victorious powers of WWII, have nuclear weapons and have the most powerful militaries in the world. The other ten members are non-permanent members, which are distributed equally among the regions of the world. The states who want to become a non-permanent member are elected by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, once elected they have a two-year term (Frederkiny, 2007 p 24). However since 1945, there have been criticisms leveled at the SC. The most common criticisms of the UN SC are the use of veto power, membership issues on the SC and the nature of SC. This essay will showcase if these criticism are justified or not and some possible reforms and responses to these criticisms.

Veto Power

One of the criticisms of United Nations Security Council is veto power. All P5 members have veto power. Veto power allows any P5 members to prevent any adoption of a resolution, regardless of the level of international support for it. The SC acts when at least nine out of 15 members vote in favour and no permanent member use their veto power (Frederkiny, 2007 p 24). Some argue that this veto power makes the UN work less effective, while others argue the veto power is protect from the tyranny of the majority in the UN.

The use of veto power as criticism of the SC is well justified by some of these reasons. The veto power made the principle of collective security action by the SC impossible, once the Cold War started as wartime partners became bitter adversaries (Ryan 2000. p12) One is the veto power is used to protect the national interests of the P5 members, and their allies, and to thwart collective punishment for their own rule violations. Freederkiny (2007. pp 29–30) gives the following examples ‘’the Council has authorized veto powers to use force in their own spheres of influence including the US in Haiti, Russia in Georgia, and France in Rwanda. The USSR [has] vetoes resolutions condemning Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia; Britain vetoed resolution condemning apartheid policies in Rhodesia and USA protecting Israel and South Africa [for their policies]. The US vetoed resolutions regarding its invasions of Panama and Grenada; the USSR vetoes resolutions regarding its interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and UK and France vetoed resolutions condemning their role in the Suez Crisis.’’ All these examples prove the misuse of the veto power of by the hands of the P5 who just pursues their own interest over the majority of states which reduces the effectiveness of the UN trying to solve some the world’s problems. It would appear that the SC is only serving a small minority over the majority of the world, despite US criticising ‘the tyranny of the majority in the UN’ when is blind to its own action transforming the SC to serve a minority elite (Ryan 2000. p170).

However there are some reasons on why this is not justified. One claim is that protect the minority over the ‘tyranny of the majority and prevent the bias world opinion from mugging the UN over an issue instead having a political debate about it.’ Diehl (2005, p150) states some states prefer this current arrangement as they are one of the P5 member’s allies who may be taking care of its business and ‘going along is just fine’ even though it has no influence over the decision-making. The SC acts when veto powers can protect common interests through multilateral collaboration (Frederkiny 2007. p31). Thus it could be argued that the SC pass resolutions on behalf and indirect consent of all the UN members regardless of any direct influence made on the SC.

There have been some attempts to reform the veto power. However the chances of that are very slim as would need the consent of the P5 members who have veto power. The veto power cannot be remove as any resolution about this will get vetoed by the P5. The only other way is to keep the right of veto, but would require the votes of two or three permanent members to block a proposal, although if this does happen there would more than 5 permanent members in the SC (Ryan 2000, p171). Diehl (2005 p161) states ‘’Adding new veto members hinders the body from acting, but this effect is small if the new members stand near positions already occupied by current veto members.’’ Regardless of any reform proposals the veto power will always remain.

Membership on the UN Security Council

Membership on the UN SC has always been a thorny issue as it involves power politics in the UN. Many countries believe the SC is not presently developed in today’s world as it’s outdated, is not representing the international opinion. This inescapably has led calls for reforms to be made to the permanent members (Ryan 2000, p 170). However for example, US oppose any changes to the status or privileges (example veto power) of the existing permanent members on the grounds that the efficiency of the UN will be reduced and any reform must be agreed by everyone (Fasulo 2003, p 50).

There are those who say the UN SC does not reflect international opinion and not democratic enough. Some new rising powers such India, Brazil, Japan, felt underrepresented and that the P5 members don’t reflect the realities of today but of those in 1940s to 1960s. It could be argued that Britain and especially France are no longer ‘Great powers’ (Blum 2005, p.634). In recent years many UN member states have begun urging a change to the Security Council to make it more reflective of today’s international realities as world is starting to transform into a multipolar world while the BRICS countries gaining influence, while western influence is gradually decreasing (Fasulo 2003, p 47). Thus there have been calls to reform the membership in the SC, which include adding new permanent members, or adding more non-permanents and some states losing their permanent member seats.

However some argue that this is not justified. Although there is general consensus for reform, there plenty of obstacles which make not worthwhile to pursue as if reform of membership of SC is made, everybody must be happy with the conditions and agree to them, which will be an almost impossible task to do. Also the challenge of reform is to maintain its responsibility and effectiveness versus democracy and representation (Blum 2005, p.645). Imagine if there are more permanent members with veto powers on the SC, the usefulness of the veto could well increase if the balance of power in the SC were to change (Bailey 1968, p56). There would be more deadlock within the SC as different interests would collide.

There are some possible reform proposals put on the table reform the membership on the SC. Many different countries have their own opinion and ideas on reform. Some say those who should be allowed to become permanent members are those who have contributed to the UN — financially and diplomatically. Germany and Japan are the world heavyweights, as they are the second and third largest financial contributors to the UN’s budget after the US, thus they feel they deserve a seat (Williams 2008, p 327). However some argue it should be based on the representativeness and contributions to UN peacekeeping, where Brazil and India would deserve to have a seat (Blum 2005, pp638). Diehl (2005, p 161) states that adding more non-permanent member seats to the SC will not change their power as even though their total power might be diminished , but since their absolute power was little to begin with, there will be little difference. Around the 2000s, there have been two proposals on reforming the membership of the SC- Model A and Model B. Model A calls for 6 new permanent members but without veto powers and 3 new non-permanent members to the SC. While Model B calls a change in the 15 non-permanent members, there would be a new category of four-year renewable term seats, which one will be a semi-permanent seat and rest of the 11 will be the same (Luck 2006 pp113–115). Most countries accept Model A and reject Model B as its too complicated (Blum 2005, p 646). However despite all these great ideas of reform, though it’s likely Model A will embraced for the reform, but not every state will accept their rival getting a higher status than them. Therefore, although reform has been on the table it will take a very long time until change happens.

Nature of the Security Council

Critics argue that the Nature of the SC is too westernized and there is no say from other members, while others claim that there have been improvements over the years in its accountability and handling. Either way the only way to for any possible reform to change the structure, restructure it or add new features into the structure, in order to improve its effectiveness and accountability.

Ryan (2000, p170) states ‘’some third world states view the UN as an agent of westernization because of the way the SC has been used … to promote certain norms [[such as democratic governance, rule of law, capitalism and human rights]] and to legitimize certain forms of intervention [[for example, reasons such as humanitarian reasons or responsibility to protect]]. They believe [the] post-cold war developments at the UN do not reveal a new era of multilateralism, but a cover of western unilateralism. This is true as most countries believe the only reason why the US supports the UN is only to serve its own interest. Thus due US influence the UN’s impartiality and legitimacy is put into question whenever it’s biased or not. Maintaining the centrality of the SC only preserves the P5 great power status, though not all deserve it (Frederkiny 2007, p33). ‘’ Plus most of the SC meetings were held in private with P5 members discussing issues among themselves, with no input from other countries (Armstrong et al, 2004 p118).

However not all these claims are justified. The P5 members created the UN to have a hierarchy in order to maintain stability in the world. The UN is organization with realist and liberalist elements inside. Imagine if there were no hierarchy in the UN, it would be anarchic and there would be no peace and stability in the world (McCarthy, 1997). All P5 members still have influence in the world, despite the rise in other powers. Also in recent years the SC is has become more active, as there are more meetings, thus the number of important decisions made concerning problems around the world has increased. When faced with a problem, sanctions have a weapon of choice for most of the SC members (Smith, et al. 2008, pp172–180).

Although reform in this area has been slow. There have been some changes. Such as in 1956, the non-permanent membership was since from 11 to 15 members (Ryan 2006, p113). Although governments are very happy to use the UN to try to solve their problems and then blame the UN for failing to find a solution to the (armed) conflict/dispute that has eluded them as the P5 members are most to blame as they provide a steady supply of weaponry to some of the world’s worst trouble spots (Ryan 2000, p174). This effect reduces confidence in the UN to function as an effective impartial organisation. However it better to have a UN rather not to have one, imperfect as it is now, with reform already on the agenda in the SC along with rapidly changing world, reform of the SC will occur within the next three decades. Also there have been attempt to make the meetings more transparent as the ‘Arria Formula’ allows more informal meetings between many countries including the P5 (Armstrong et al, 2004 p119).

Conclusion

It is clear that these criticisms of the SC: Veto power, membership and the nature, while they are justified in some ways and counter-arguments made against them appear just to stall the process of reform and may hinder progress of solving some the world’s problems. There have been many new and creative ideas on how to deal with these criticisms through reform proposals, however one of the major problems of implanting it, is that the P5 members and most of the States in the world must agree to them. Despite how many criticisms have been thrown at the SC, it has done its job, not perfectly, of maintaining peace, security and stability in the world (Global Policy 2005). It is better than having nothing at all.

References

Armstrong A, Lloyd L, Redmond J (2004) International organisation in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan

Bailey, S.D (1968) ‘Veto in the Security Council’, International Conciliation №566, January 1968

Blum (2005) ‘Proposals for Security Council Reform’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 99, no. 3, July 2005, 632–49.

Diehl, Paul Francis (2005) The Politics of global governance: international organizations in an interdependent world, Boulder, Colo : Lynne Rienner Publishers

Fasulo, Linda (2003) An insider’s guide to the UN, New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press

Frederking, Brian (2007) The United States and the Security Council : collective security since the Cold War, London: Routledge

Luck, Edward C (2006) The UN Security Council. Practice and Promise, London: Routledge

McCarthy, Patrick (1997) ‘Positionality, tension and instability in the UN Security Council’, Global Governance, vol. 3, no. 2, May-August 1997, 147–69.

Ryan, Stephen (2000) The United Nations and international politics, Houndmills: Macmillan Press

Smith, Hadfield, Dunne (2008) Foreign policy : theories, actors, cases, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Williams, Paul D (2008) Security Studies: An Introduction, London : Routledge

James Paul and Céline Nahory. (2005). Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council.Available:http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/41131.html?itemid=914. Last accessed 20/11/2012.