Nuclear weapons are multi-purpose and multi-functional.
Nuclear weapons are often termed as Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nine countries in the world currently have nuclear weapons — USA, Russia/USSR, UK, France, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and (North) Korea (Williams, 2013 pp. 410). These countries all have different reasons of obtaining nuclear weapons. In fact the purposes of nuclear weapons are multi-purpose and multi-functional. This essay will examine how nuclear weapons are used as strategic, political and cultural reasons with the reasoning of different International Relations theories such as Realism and Social Constructivism.
Strategic instruments
When nuclear weapons are used as strategic instruments they are mostly obtained for security reasons. This fits in with the realism theory. However there are different branches of realism which can be used to explain why and how a state uses the obtainment of nuclear weapons for strategic instruments.
To begin with Neo-realism, neo-realism or structural realism stresses that since the international world system is anarchic; the main national interest of a state is survival in the self-help system (Baylis et al. 2011, pp. 86). It is the international structure that Nuclear weapons contribute to safeguarding to a state’s security against external threats. According to Waltz and Sagan (2003 pp. 7), they believe that the main purpose of obtaining nuclear weapons is for defensive and deterrence purposes. Therefore, the likelihood of war between nuclear states is likely to be decrease due to the fear of retaliation and mutual assured destruction. From a strategic point of view, nuclear weapons help ensure the survival of the state and helps maintains stabilizing a balance of power. Hence a deterrent balance is created and preserves the peace between the nuclear states. Thus examples of deterrent balances include the US-USSR, USSR-China and India-Pakistan. However it is maintained that once a great power obtains nuclear weapons, their arch-rival will also obtain nuclear weapons to counter-balance the balance of power, examples — USSR against USA, India against China and Pakistan against India (Sagan 1996–97, pp. 58–59). These are classic cases of compellence and deterrence. This resulted to a security dilemma, as states that build and obtain nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, will be seen by other states as offensive reasons, thus this can trigger an arms race just like the nuclear arms race between USA and USSR throughout the Cold War. Despite some minor incidents between the nuclear states, for the fear of escalation they do not want to fight intensely and harm other important interests such economical (Waltz and Sagan, 2003 pp. 37).
For Offensive realism and defensive realism, the strategic reason for obtaining nuclear weapons is different. Within a defensive realist perspective is to obtain enough nuclear weapons to ensure the state’s survival and for self-defence purposes. This will most likely produce balance of power scenario where when one state possesses a number of nuclear weapons, rival states will attempt to obtain more nuclear weapons which in engaging in an act of balancing, therefore nuclear deterrence to preserve the peace (Little 2007 pp.138). Within an offensive realist perspective, the strategic use of nuclear weapons is to have as much as possible not only to deter enemies but also encourage band-wagoning and buck-passing where weaker states would join the stronger nuclear states for nuclear security and for their survival (Collins 2010, pp. 22–23). This is true during the Cold War in Europe as both NATO and Warsaw Pact members had either USA or USSR nuclear missiles placed on their territories for security reasons. However due to the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, it is more likely that defensive realist perspective will be used since the rational deterrence theory due to the Mutual assured destruction principle (Shimko 2013, pp 227). Therefore it is unlikely that the offensive realist respective ‘Peace through Strength’ will produce any of the results of band-wagoning or bucking as the world is slowly transforming into a multi-polar world. Although there some European states are still practicing these notions through the USA, the reason is that it’s through NATO which is a creation from the Cold War and continues to survive (Williams 2013, pp351–352). There are not any other states jumping on the bandwagon asking for nuclear protection from any of the other nine nuclear states. Due to the efforts of nuclear proliferation, the current nuclear states are trying to prevent certain states (North Korea and Iran) with nuclear programmes to abandon them in order to prevent their nearby neighbours to go ‘nuclear’ as well as this will create more problems and instability (Mansbach and Taylor 2012, pp. 210).
Political instruments
Nuclear weapons used as political instruments will be explained with a mixture of social constructivist and realist theories. Also political instruments can be split into two parts — the use of nuclear weapons as a political instrument in domestic/internal affairs of a state and in foreign affairs/relations of that state with other states.
Within domestic sphere, the structure of the state or government influences on how the use and obtainment of nuclear weapons are used as political instruments. There are many actors within government structure using different reasoning on acquiring nuclear weapons or energy, for example, the elected leader might pursue it to remain in office, the military would want it to add another weapon in its arsenal for defence purposes and also boost the image of the military, and other reasons could be for medical purposes, energy purposes in attempt to diversify its energy consumption and technological purposes (Sagan, 1996–97 pp. 63–64). Take the example of India where it took a decade for India to produce nuclear weapons after China due to prolonged bureaucratic political battle (Sagan, 1996–97, pp. 65). This highlights using social constructivism theories of the competing roles within the government structure shows how nuclear weapons are used as political instruments for domestic issues, although within the domestic sphere the use nuclear power is dual-use, not only for military purposes, but also for civilian purposes.
In foreign affairs, the uses of nuclear weapons as political instruments can be become an issue within the international relations arena which will be explained using various theories. States do diplomacy with each other within an anarchic international system with anarchy is what states make of it (Shimko 2013, pp. 52–53). Thus having nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons program (alleged or not), will not only increase the chances of state survival, but can be used as a bargaining chip and for gunboat diplomacy. (North) Korea for example has been using both realist strategies, its nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip in exchange for economic and humanitarian aid and showcasing its power for defensive purposes against its advanced ‘hostile’ neighbours mostly to USA (D.T. and H.T., 2013). Within a social constructivist perspective, nuclear weapons are needed due the social dimensions the states are in, to identify and shape themselves as great states and due to history of the processes of interaction, nuclear weapons is one of the language the states use to communicate with other states(Dunne, et al. 2009, pp. 178–180). Autocratic and dictatorship states such as Libya and Iraq also had nuclear weapons program, for those states the head of state is the state, thus having nuclear weapons will not only help maintain the greatness and increase public support of the ruling elite and regime, but can be used as leverage when dealing with ‘hostile states’. For example in the case of Libya, it gave up its nuclear weapons program in return for economic incentives, removal of sanctions and normalisation of relations with Western countries, in other words Libya opened itself up by using its nuclear weapons program as a political instrument, although later Gaddafi regretted his decision to abandon them as his regime lost leverage in international dealings (Sanger, 2011). However for liberalist perspective, there is no need for states to behave with self-interest. Nuclear weapons belong in the bygone era the Cold War and it’s dangerous to have another. Nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons free zones are the way forward (Baylis, et al. 2011, pp. 385). Like the case of Libya, nuclear disarmament will lead to the exchange of economic integration and also gradual introduction of democratic reforms within the state. Also new institutional norms are increasingly introducing new constraints on nuclear behaviour (Baylis et al. 2011, pp. 388). As a political instrument, the abandonment of a nuclear power program can unintentionally lead to peaceful relations and co-operation between states. This appears to be the aim of Western and western-allied countries when dealing with ‘rogue’ state such Iran, (North) Korea, Myanmar, and Libya. However the success of diplomacy using nuclear weapons as a political instrument with each different country has produced different results due to the different historical relations between the states.
Cultural instruments
Nuclear weapons can be used as cultural instruments within a constructivist perspective. There are two uses of how nuclear weapons can be used as cultural instruments — symbols of national identity and the possession of nuclear weapon is the one of the signs of a great power.
States that have nuclear weapons or were pursuing such programs or doing so now, believed that having such nuclear weapons were one of the signs of being a great power. Since Nuclear weapons are seen as the most modern form of weaponry, and their guardians were automatically guaranteed a top seat in International affairs (Baylis, et al 2010, pp. 388). France during 1960s sought to develop its nuclear weapons mostly to maintain its great power status since decolonization within the French Empire had begun and also to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent (Sagan 1996–97, pp. 77–79). The United Kingdom also obtained nuclear weapons for similar reasons. After the P5 members of the security council became nuclear states, other states such as Israel, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, (North) Korea and others pursued nuclear programs to become sophisticated and be part of the ‘nuclear club’ (Baylis, et al. 2011 pp. 160). The reason was at that time the international structure introduced by social, forced from USA and USSR influence the identity of a great power must also have nuclear weapons. For these countries nuclear weapons are ultimate status symbol (Baylis, et al. 2011, pp. 289).
Nuclear weapons can also be used as symbols of national identity. Nuclear weapons can unite a nation; make its people feel proud of its achievements as it’s a matter of prestige (Mansbach and Taylor 2013, pp. 211). Also state will recognize itself as a great power with regional influence. That was one the main reasoning for India and also Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former president of Pakistan, once said during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.” There is also a religious aspect to as that time, as no Muslim country has yet developed the bomb. This was reinforced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who said in 1979 “The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have this [nuclear] capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.” In other words there needs to be an Islamic (nuclear) bomb (Shaikh 2002, pp. 39). This motivated Pakistan to build nuclear weapons for not only for Pakistan’s own national interests, but also to demonstrate that Muslim civilisation can also create nuclear weapons. Thus when Pakistan produces nuclear weapons to counter-balance and as a deterrent against India, not only did it made ordinary Pakistanis proud of their country since the humiliating defeat of Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, against India and the loss of territory of East Pakistan, it also became the first Islamic state to obtain nuclear weapons, which is spectacle achievement throughout the Muslim world. Even in (North) Korea, its nuclear weapons program is a source of pride for the Koreans to highlight (North) Korea is powerful state and also to maintain and remind that Kim Dynasty are almost godlike status within the state (Mansbach and Taylor 2012, pp. 210). Hence like space program, nuclear weapons are a source of pride for a state and using them cultural instruments will help state become a stronger and better nation.
In Conclusion, they can be used for cultural, strategic and political instruments. Sagan (1996/97, pp55) best summarizes “Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic [and foreign] debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.”
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